


Payment Security: Attacks & Defences

Dr Steven J Murdoch University College London


COMPGA03, 2014-12-02

UK fraud is going up again



...even types of fraud Chip and PIN was supposed to prevent

Card-not-present: up 22% to £301m



Lost and stolen: up 7% to £58.9m Counterfeit: up 3% to £43.4m

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
within total fraud figures

UK retail face-to-face: up 11% to £60.8m UK cash machine: up 10% to £31.9m

Chip and PIN transactions have three main stages


- Card authentication: card proves it is real through providing a digital signature that the terminal can verify
- **Cardholder verification**: card and terminal check that legitimate cardholder is present (normally by card verifying the PIN)
- **Transaction authorisation**: terminal checks with bank that previous steps have been followed and the transaction should proceed

Card authentication




2. PIN entered by customer

Cardholder verification



2. PIN entered by customer

Transaction authorisation



2. PIN entered by customer

Criminals have successfully bypassed Chip & PIN

Obtain static data as a result of flawed tamper resistance in Chip & PIN terminals

then Bypass card authentication through exploiting backwards compatibility mode Counterfeit


Steal cards *then* **Bypass cardholder verification** by exploiting Chip and PIN protocol flaws

Lost and Stolen


Sensitive data is sent unencrypted between the card and the terminal

- Card number, expiry date, cardholder name ...
- Copy of magnetic stripe including CVV (for some cards)
- PIN to be checked by card

Chip and PIN terminals are supposed to protect this information against being recorded: tamper resistance





Tamper switches




Tamper mesh











Criminal gets all that is needed to make a magnetic stripe card

- Card number, expiry date
- CVV
- Cardholder's PIN


Compromising a shop terminal now gives criminals enough information to make ATM withdrawal

Criminal gets all that is needed to make a magnetic stripe card

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


Chip and PIN led to increase in counterfeit fraud




Card is responsible for cardholder verification

- Card states ways by which cardholder verification can be performed and the preference (e.g. first PIN, then signature)
- If PIN used, terminal sends PIN to card and card checks if correct
- PIN sometimes encrypted
- Response not encrypted or authenticated



The no-PIN attack



Response from industry

What is more, at this stage, the observations are the result of scientific research whose transposition outside laboratory conditions is complex since it would necessitate the use of highly sophisticated material.

— Le GIE des Cartes Bancaires (January 2010)

Neither the banking industry nor the police have any evidence of criminals having the capability to deploy such sophisticated attacks.

— UK Cards Association (February 2010))

Response from criminals



parisienne et dans le Nord. Plusieurs d'entre

(OCLCTIC). Selon les premiers éléments de

enquêteurs de l'Office central de lutte contre la

eux viennent d'être interpellés par les

criminalité liée aux technologies de

l'information et de la communication

Anderson — a été appliquée pour la première fois en France par une équipe établie en région

l'enquête, les malfrats ont réalisé près de 6000 achats pour un préjudice de plus de 500 000 €.

Les policiers craignent de voir cette technique se répandre. « Pour l'heure, même si la personne

qui s'est fait voler ou qui a perdu sa carte fait opposition sur cette dernière, les escrocs peuvent,

malgré tout, continuer à s'en servir, note un policier spécialisé. C'est tout le problème de cette

SUR LE MÊME SUJET

Avez-vous confiance en votre carte bancaire?

LES ARTICLES LES PLUS...



le 24/09/2014 à 21h43

Algérie : l'otage français Hervé Gourdel a été exécuté par les jihadistes

le 24/09/2014 à 07h11

SNCF : un apéro, des sanctions... et une grève

le 25/09/2014 à 00h06

Mort de l'otage français : «Les auteurs devront être châtiés», prévient Holande

Response from criminals



ON THIS TOPIC

Do you trust your credit card?

the Paris region and in the north. Many of them have just been arrested by investigators from the Central Office for the Fight against crime related to information technology and communication (OCLCTIC). According to preliminary investigation, the thugs have made

nearly 6,000 purchases for damages of more than \in 500,000. Officers fear that this technique spread. "For the time being, even if the person who was stolen or lost card opposed to the latter, scammers may nevertheless continue to use it, says a specialist officer. That's the whole problem with this scam. Thieves rajoutent on the map stolen a second chip that tricks the payment terminal at the merchant, into believing that the PIN is the correct compound. The

MORE ARTICLES ...



9/24/2014 9:43 p.m. at the

Algeria: French hostage Hervé Gourdel was executed by jihadists

9/24/2014 7:11 in the

station: a drink, sanctions ... and a strike

9/25/2014 0:06 in the

Death of French hostage: "Authors should be punished," warns Holande

0/24/2014 1-21 m m ak kk

A A ⊟ 🖬 🖽 Reactions

Crooks, highly experienced, have managed to bypass the security chip embedded bank cards deemed inviolable - before multiplying scams. The technique - unearthed in 2010 by a British academic, Professor Ross Anderson - was applied for the first time in France by a team based in

ON THIS TOPIC

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HOW DOES THE STRATEGY WORK

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Scammers steal bank cards by stealth to avoid attracting the attention of their victims too quickly.

2 They then modify the card, replacing existing chip with another, programmed with software that blocks the security

The scammers can then **enter any PIN** to pay for purchases costing less than €100.

The scammers are buying, in general, consumer products that can be quickly sold on black-market. ade Ie

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
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
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What about online fraud?




What about online fraud?

Card-not-present: up 22% to £301m



Pay a bill	Check balance
	Transfer money
Destination account number	Pay a bill
	Logout
Recipient name	
Amount	
One time password	

EMV-CAP in the UK



EMV CAP's weakness: attacker controls user experience

- User thinks they are typing random challenge but it is really part of an account number
- User thinks it's OK that details on device don't match those they entered on the computer
- User thinks they are performing a POS transaction but really it's online banking



Usability is a security requirement



